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This chapter takes its point of departure in the so-called Swedish paradox, according to 
which the Swedish NSI is plagued by low pay-off in relation to very high investments in R&D 
and innovation efforts. Using new data, we show that this paradox is still in operation, i.e. the 
productivity or efficiency of the Swedish NSI remains low. We also specify the paradox in 
several respects. By focussing upon nine activities in the NSI, we attempt to explain why and 
how the paradox operates. The paradox is also related to the moderate growth of labour 
productivity in Sweden. Further, we show that the paradox is linked to globalization: 
internationalization of production by Swedish firms has proceeded further than the 
internationalization of R&D. On the basis of this analysis, we identify strengths and 
weaknesses of the Swedish NSI – many of which are related to the Swedish paradox. We 
take account of the history of innovation policy in Sweden and – on the basis of the analysis 
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Annika Rickne 1 Introduction 
 
The notion of a ‘Swedish paradox’ has been central to recent innovation policy 
discussions in Sweden. When first formulated, it was as a reflection of a high research 
and development (R&D) intensity in Sweden coupled with a low share of high-tech 
(R&D intensive) products in manufacturing as compared to the OECD (organization for 
economic co-operation and development countries. It was seen as a paradox between a 
high input and a low output measured by these specific indicators (Edquist and 
McKelvey, 1998).
2  In other words, it pointed to a low productivity of the Swedish 
national system of innovation (NSI) in this specific sense. Subsequently, the expression 
has been used widely, but often formulated as a general relation between inputs and 
outputs – e.g. that the investments in R&D in Sweden are very large, but that the ‘pay-
off’ (in terms, e.g., of growth and competitiveness) is not particularly impressive (e.g. 
Andersson et al., 2002, Chapter 2). Due to varying uses of the concept, and since many 
formulations have been based on rather partial data, it is not yet clear to what extent there 
exists a paradox or where the gap between input and output resides. In this chapter, we 
will discuss the Swedish paradox in terms of a relation between inputs of R&D and 
innovation efforts and outputs of innovations of different kinds. 
Those studies that propose that there exists a paradox have also formulated a number 
of different hypotheses to explain it. (1) One proposition is that the knowledge resulting 
from R&D remains in the R&D sphere - e.g. in universities or corporate research units - 
and hence is not transformed into innovations. (2) Another is that the paradox can be 
explained by the sectoral allocation of R&D investments. (3) A third is that the internationalization of production has proceeded further than that of R&D, so that R&D 
carried out in Sweden bears fruit, as innovations, elsewhere, sometimes in the 
subsidiaries of Swedish multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Edquist, 2002, Sections 4.6 
and 4.3). However, we still lack a thorough discussion of the validity of these 
propositions or of the relations among them. 
Against this background, we aim to analyse the Swedish NSI. In doing so, we follow 
the structure and model table of contents presented in the introduction to this book. 
Among many other things, we scrutinize whether there is support for the paradox, and if 
so how it may be explained. Specifically related to the paradox, we revisit and 
reformulate the paradox in Section 3 through an analysis of detailed and comparative data 
from the 2nd and 3rd Community Innovation Surveys (CIS2/3). To assess the grounds for 
competing explanations of the paradox, a detailed analysis of activities possibly 
influencing innovation processes in Sweden - also presented in the introductory chapter - 
follows in Section 4.  
 
2 Main  historical  trends 
 
Two main traits characterise the evolution of the Swedish NSI. First, the natural resource 
base in Sweden - i.e. forests and minerals – and the economic history of Sweden from the 
industrial revolution and onwards have both strongly influenced the present anatomy of 
the Swedish NSI. Second, the general pattern of economic development can be 
summarized in terms of ‘the combination of exports based on refined and processed 
materials on the one hand and the multinational engineering firms on the other’ (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993, p. 272). As for the resulting character of the NSI, attention should be 
drawn to the decisive role played by a ‘small number of multinational firms in the 
engineering industry’ (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993, p. 272).
3  
In the latter half of the 19th century, Sweden was primarily agrarian. Its exports were 
dominated by products from agriculture and the mining and forest industries (iron and 
sawn lumber). After the mid-19th century, though, new production processes allowed the 
export of more refined products from these industries – machinery products and pulp and 
paper, respectively. The engineering industry subsequently expanded significantly in 
terms of both employment and export shares, rising from 3 per cent of total exports in 
1880 to 10.5 per cent in 1910-1911, and reaching over 20 per cent in 1950. Among 
OECD countries, the share of manufacturing exports held by engineering industries in 
Sweden during the 1950s was surpassed only by USA (ibid., p. 271). 
Sweden was thus a late but rapidly industrialising country, developing a strong 
specialisation in mechanical engineering technologies related to the extraction and 
processing of raw materials. Significantly, its major innovations in machinery products 
during the late 19th century were ‘all closely related to the export-oriented process 
industries’ (ibid., p. 271). Later product innovations that became the basis of 
multinational firms were also concentrated in engineering firms, although the base 
widened to include both mechanical and electro-mechanical technologies.  
The Swedish economy has historically been strongly specialized in low-growth sectors 
(Jacobsson and Philipsson, 1996). Prior to the 1990s, the more knowledge-intensive 
growth sectors, often referred to as high-technology (i.e. R&D intensive) production 
sectors were relatively underdeveloped (Ohlsson and Vinell, 1987). A study of Sweden’s production structure in manufacturing for the period from 1975 to 1991 showed that 
Sweden actually had a declining proportion of production in the R&D intensive growth 
industries – from 100 per cent of the OECD average in 1975 to 76 per cent in 1991 
(Edquist and Texier, 1996, p. 110). One consequence of this negative specialisation in 
growth sectors was an exceptionally strong decline of employment in manufacturing 
(Edquist and Texier, 1996, p. 113-117).  
Sweden joined the EU in 1995 in the hope that increased exposure to international 
demand would lead to diversification and renewed growth, recognising that the ‘home 
market’ could no longer provide a sufficient basis for growth and the development of new 
technologies and industries (Benner, 1997, p. 187-188). Initially, this strategy of 
exploiting the economies of scale offered by international markets did not bring about 
diversification, but instead tended to consolidate the pre-existing production structure and 
established technological trajectories (Carlsson, 1996). 
The 1990s witnessed some positive changes in Sweden’s sectoral production structure. 
The general increase in service sector employment, relative to manufacturing 
employment during 1980-1994 was marked by a modest increase in the share of 
employment held by knowledge-intensive service industries (Nutek, 2000, p. 41-43). 
Also, from 1980 to 1996 and especially in the latter part of the period, Sweden 
significantly increased its export specialisation in high-technology manufacturing, while 
losing market shares in medium-high-technology manufacturing (ibid., p. 47-52).  
In 1997, a statistical study of the Swedish NSI, based on a comparison of seven 
countries (Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and USA), found that 
Sweden ranked fourth in terms of the share of manufacturing employment held by high-technology sectors. Furthermore Sweden ranked fifth in terms of the share of the total 
labour force employed in high-technology manufacturing (Nutek, 1998, Figure 3.8). 
Swedish production of high-technology products had also increased from 8.8 per cent of 
all manufacturing production in 1993 to 12.5 per cent in 1996, owing largely to rapid 
growth in two high-technology sectors in which Sweden was already specialized – 
telecommunications equipment and pharmaceutical products (ibid., Table 3.2).These 
developments improved Sweden’s international ranking as a high-technology exporter 
(Braunerhjelm and Thulin, 2004, Table 1).  
To the extent that Sweden’s high-technology manufacturing industries expanded their 
exports of domestically produced goods, international demand acted as a spur to 
continued technological development, not only within the exporting firms, but also 
among their domestic suppliers. However, Swedish MNEs – and particularly those 
specialised in high-technology – were simultaneously pursuing a strategy of exploiting 
international economies of scale through foreign direct investment (FDI), partly in order 
to avoid high domestic production costs (Braunerhjelm, 2004, p.18, Figure 16).  
 




The Swedish paradox refers to a mismatch between very high values on indicators of 
inputs into innovation and low values on output indicators. Here we revisit the alleged paradox and try to reformulate it in more specific terms, based on CIS data and using a 
comparative research design.
4 First, we identify the strengths and weaknesses of the NSI 
via comparisons with other countries. We focus on some of the small open European 
economies included in this book, i.e. the other Nordic countries, the Netherlands and 
Ireland. Second, to capture the dynamics, we compare the indicators over time for 
Sweden, using CIS data from two periods, i.e. 1994-1996 (CIS2) and 1998- 2000 
(CIS3).
5 Third, we compare different sectors (manufacturing, knowledge intensive 
business sectors (KIBS), finance, trade) and size classes (large firms versus small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs)).  
 
The Swedish paradox revisited 
 
Revisiting the validity of the paradox in the light of new data presented in a separate 
paper (Bitard et al., 2005), we can confirm that R&D intensity and innovation intensity 
(as input measures) of Swedish firms is very high compared to the other small 
industrialized, European countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Norway). In 1994-96 Swedish firms invested 4.0 per cent of their turnover in R&D, 
compared to the group average of 2.3 per cent. Sweden ranked first and none of the other 
countries invested above average. Intriguingly, the Swedish figure was 38 per cent higher 
than the figure for the country ranked second (i.e. Denmark). 
A complementary but wider input indicator is innovation intensity.
6 For this indicator, 
too, Sweden ranks first. The Swedish figure in 1994-1996 was 6.7 per cent compared to 
the average of 4.1 per cent, and it was similarly high during 1998-2000.
7 This pattern holds not only for all firms, but also for the manufacturing sector, which is of specific 
interest.  
We conclude that the input component of the Swedish paradox can be extended to all 
innovation expenditures, and not only to R&D expenditures. Indeed, the difference 
between Sweden and the other countries was even larger for innovation intensity than for 
R&D intensity.  
At a disaggregated level, however, there is an interesting exception to this overall 
picture. For SMEs, Sweden ranks only second with regard to innovation intensity, far 
surpassed by Denmark: Swedish SMEs spent 2.7 per cent of their turnover on innovation, 
whereas the Danish ones spent 4.9 per cent – i.e. the Danish firms spent 81 per cent more. 
While in most countries SMEs spend less on innovation than large firms, Sweden had the 
largest difference in this respect. This difference was 3 times larger than that in Finland, 
with the second-largest gap, where large firms spent 2.5 times more than SMEs.  
On the output side, we revisit the paradox by analyzing the proportion of innovating 
firms, the share of all firms that have introduced new processes, and the share of firms 
having introduced product innovations.  
First, the proportion of innovating firms measures the share of firms that have 
introduced either a product or a process innovation. For this indicator, Sweden (all 
Swedish firms) ranked only 4th for both periods with a performance only slightly above 
average. Sweden was followed by Norway and Finland for the 1994-1996 period, and by 
Norway only in the 1998-2000 period. However, when the data is disaggregated into 
manufacturing, KIBS, finance and trade, Swedish firms perform much better in the 
service sectors of finance and trade than in manufacturing. Second, focusing on the share of all firms that have introduced new processes during a 
three year period, Sweden’s performance was 14 per cent below the average, and Sweden 
was ranked 4th (out of 6) for the first period, and 5th (out of 5) in the second period.
8 
Hence, Sweden is at the bottom in comparison, even though differences among the five 
countries were rather small. Worryingly, the Swedish position deteriorated over time 
between the two periods. However, Swedish firms performed somewhat better in services 
than in manufacturing. It is interesting that previous studies have shown that in the past 
Sweden – at least Swedish engineering industry – has been very advanced with regard to 
the introduction of new process innovations (Edquist and Jacobsson, 1988).
9 However, 
judging from the CIS data, this no longer seems to be true. 
Third, we have analyzed four indicators related to product innovations. The indicator 
introduction of new to the firm products measures the share of firms that during a three-
year period introduced products that were new to them (but not to the ‘world’). On this 
indicator, Sweden ranked 4th (out of 6) for 1994-1996 and 4th (out of 5) for 1998-2000.  
As a contrast, the indicator introduction of new to the market products measures the 
share of firms that during a three-year period introduced products that were new to the 
market (i.e., new to the ‘world’). On this indicator, Sweden ranked 4th (out of 5), with 
only Norway behind. Interestingly, on both indicators Swedish firms performed better in 
comparison to other countries in services, but poorly in comparison to other countries in 
manufacturing. 
The indicator turnover due to new to the firm products is the turnover due to new-to- 
the-firm products introduced during a certain period, divided by total turnover at the end 
of the period. On this indicator, Sweden performs very well, ranking first among the 5 countries compared. Hence the performance is much better in this respect than with 
regard to the proportion of all firms that innovate in new-to-the-firm products.  
The indicator turnover due to new to the market products is the ratio of turnover due to 
new products or significantly improved products (goods or services) introduced during 
the period 1998-2000, divided by the total turnover in 2000. On this indicator, Sweden is 
somewhat below the average, ranking 3rd (out of four). Thus, Swedish firms perform 
relatively worse with regard to creation than to imitation.  
It is also interesting that the performance on this indicator is much better for small 
firms than for large ones, i.e. small firms are much more creative than large ones, as 
compared to the other countries. Hence the overall performance of all firms – which is, 
on the average, worse with regard to creation than to imitation – can be explained by the 




Comparatively speaking the input indicators for Swedish firms are very high. On the 
output side all indicators are quite low compared to the other countries – with only one 
exception: turnover due to new to the firm product.
10
The comparison made here has been with 4-5 other small industrialized countries in 
Europe and the result should be tested through further comparisons with more countries. 
Even so, we have reformulated the paradox in more specific terms than previously 
discussed in research and policy literature. Our overall conclusion is that the Swedish 
NSI is not as capable as some other small industrialized countries of transforming the very large resources invested in R&D and innovation activities on the input side into 
correspondingly large outputs of product and process innovations on the output side. The 
productivity (or efficiency) of the Swedish NSI is, in this sense, simply not high. Hence 
the existence of the Swedish paradox is confirmed on the basis of the different, broader 
and more detailed indicators based on CIS2 and CIS3.
11 More specifically, the results 
suggest that the underlying problem may reside with the large firms that dominate the 
NSI, and their under-performance in innovation outputs.  
The conclusions of the analysis in section 3 will be discussed in considerably more 
detail in Section 7.1. 
 
4  Activities that influence innovation 
 
Having confirmed, extended and specified the Swedish paradox in the previous section, 
we will now conduct a detailed analysis of the activities possibly influencing innovation 
processes. Among other things, this will contribute to assess the validity of the three 
hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the paradox (see the Introduction to this 
chapter). We follow a set of authors who have stressed the need to go beyond the 
structural components of an NSI and concentrate on the activities or functions of the 
system (Johnson, 1998; Rickne, 2000; Liu and White, 2001; Johnson and Jacobsson, 
2003; Edquist, 2005; Bergek et al., 2006; Bergek et al., 2007).  
In this book we take the specific approach of activities. Edquist (2005) has compiled a 
general set of activities that may serve as a starting point for our analysis. These activities 
were presented in Box 2 of the introductory chapter of this book. This list is only ‘provisional’. Thus, our analysis does not claim to analyse all vital activities – or all 
aspects of these activities. Further, it does not rank the activities in importance, or reveal 
a master plan for redesigning the Swedish NSI. We hope simply to reflect tentatively on 
the extent to which innovation patterns in Sweden - and specifically the paradox - can be 
related to the activities of the system.  
 
4.1  Knowledge inputs to innovation   
 
4.1.1 R&D  activities
12 
 
Measuring the volume of R&D input by national R&D expenditures as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP), Sweden figures in the very top among OECD countries 
together with Israel, spending more than 1.8 times the OECD average and more than 
twice the EU average on R&D (Jacobsson and Rickne, 2004). Sweden and Finland are 
the only European countries that have displayed a catch-up vis-à-vis the USA on this 
indicator since 1991 (European Commission, 2003). Sweden has strongly increased its 
R&D spending, from a level of 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 4.3 per cent in 2001 
(Marklund et al., 2004).
13 Noteworthy though, even though the growth rate is clearly 
positive with 2.2 per cent average annual growth from 1995 and on, several other 
countries have a stronger growth rate (e.g. Greece, Finland, Portugal) (European 
Commission, 2003, Figure 2.1.8). Sweden’s scientific output, as measured by publication, is high, accounting for 1.75 
per cent of world publications, and placing it at rank 14 in spite of being a small country 
(ibid.). In addition, the citation rate, indicating quality, is relatively high, though it has 
recently declined in some biotechnology-related fields (Sandström et al., 2003). 
Sweden’s scientific productivity
14 is not above that of many other OECD countries. 
(ibid.). However, the technological output as measured by patents is well above the EU 
average, vis-à-vis both actual numbers (rating as number 8) and growth rate, and Sweden 
is listed among the five fastest growing EU countries as regards patenting in the EU. As 
to the world’s share of US patents, Sweden ranks 7th but shows a moderate growth 
compared to other European countries (ibid., Table 1.6)..  
Sweden’s relative scientific specialisation resembles that of Finland and Denmark, and 
lies within life sciences, food science and agriculture, environmental sciences, civil 
engineering and materials science (European Commission, 2003). In most of these fields 
the citation impact is above average, being especially strong within pharmacology and 
clinical medicine. The scientific profile is dominated by bio-medically related fields, 
where clinical medicine and health science, biomedicine and pharmacology and basic life 
science account for 56 per cent of the publications. Only the UK, the Netherlands and the 
USA have a comparable focus on these fields. Notable in comparison with other OECD 
countries is also a relatively small focus on chemistry as well as on physics and 
astronomy. As ‘the ‘age of the atom’ is being overtaken by the ‘age of the molecule’ and, 
more recently, the gene’ (ibid., 2003, p. 290), this may mean that Sweden is taking a 
promising direction. However, the fields of computer science, mathematics and statistics together account for only 3.2 per cent of the publications in this period (ibid., Figures 
5.2.12-13).  
In contrast, Sweden’s technological specialisation (as measured by patenting across 
major technology fields) lies in general in mechanics and process industries with relative 
strengths in pharmaceuticals, telecom, materials and analysis-control, and weaknesses in 
biotechnology, audio-visual, IT and semiconductors. Notably, patenting growth rates are 
well above average in all fields except biotechnology and materials (ibid.). Even 
considering the time lag issue, this mismatch between the scientific and technological 
profiles may partly explain the low innovation output discussed in Section 3. 
The Swedish organisation of R&D, whereby the business sector accounts for a major 
share of the activity, is different from many other OECD countries where firms are less 
prominent in R&D, but similar to that of the USA, Ireland, Belgium, Korea and Japan 
(Jacobsson and Rickne, 2004). The business sector has strengthened its dominance over 
the last two decades, driving the growth of R&D activity. In contrast, expenditure on 
R&D in the higher educational sector has remained fairly constant since the beginning of 
the 1980s and the government sector had only a slow increase until the end of the 1990s. 
Within the business enterprise sector, the large firms - with 500 employees or more - 
account for 83 per cent of R&D.
15 While the contribution of the service sector to R&D 
was still relatively small in 2001, it was above the EU average and its growth exceeded 
that of manufacturing. In non-business R&D, the higher education sector assumes a 
major role, while government research bodies and private non-profit organisations are 
relatively small actors compared to other countries. As regards sources of R&D 
financing, the share from corporate sources is large – considerably above the EU average - and comes second only to Japan. Interestingly, it has increased over time, at the expense 
of public sector financing,
16 and was 72 per cent of the total financing in 2001 (Jacobsson 
and Rickne, 2004).  
 In brief, Sweden has clear strengths regarding both input and output of R&D. As 
pointed out in Section 3, Sweden’s innovative firms are now increasingly located in 
services, and we have seen in this section that Swedish R&D is also characterised by 
strong dominance of the business enterprise sector – particularly by large firms – and 
relatively high rates of growth within the service sector. Coupled with these positive traits 
concerns are, however, raised regarding a potential mismatch between the scientific 
profile and the technological profile, potentially explaining that there is a problem in 
transferring scientific knowledge into industrial needs in Sweden.  
 
4.1.2  Competence building  
 
In 1994, total Swedish spending on education as a proportion of GDP was the highest in 
the world (OECD, 1998, p. 37), and in 1999 Sweden remained one of the leading OECD 
countries, with a share of 6.7 per cent just slightly below the leader, Korea, at 6.8 per 
cent, and well above the average of 5.8 per cent. (OECD, 2002, p. 170, Table B2.1a) 
Sweden also allocates a comparatively high proportion of educational expenditure to 
tertiary education. In 1999, Sweden spent 2.1 per cent of GDP on tertiary education, 
compared to an OECD average of 1.2 per cent (ibid., p. 78, Table B3.1). In 2003, this 
level of expenditure remained essentially unchanged, and Sweden ranked fifth among 25 
OECD countries (Högskoleverket, 2003, p. 22).  Consequently, the Swedish labour force has a comparatively high level of educational 
attainment, with a rate of university graduation above the OECD average (OECD, 2002, 
p. 54, Table A31b). About 30 per cent of an age cohort graduates from higher education 
(Högskoleverket, 2003, p. 28). An OECD comparison of the EU-15, along with the USA, 
New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, ranked Sweden third in terms of the proportion of 
the adult population participating in education and training in 2001. The Swedish 
participation rate of about 55 per cent in 2001 was surpassed only by Finland (about 56 
per cent) and Denmark (around 58 per cent). (OECD, 2002, p. 249, Chart C4.2) In 
another EU-15 comparison of workplace-based education in 2000, Sweden ranked fifth, 
with a participation rate of 42 per cent – well above the average of roughly 33 per cent. 
(Aspgren, 2002, pp.105-106, Figure 5.7).  
Recently, Sweden has expanded its higher education system, developing towards a 
mass rather than an elite system, predominantly academic rather than vocational in 
orientation (Sohlman, 1996; 1999). The engineering shortages of the past have been 
overcome, with graduation rates of natural scientists and engineers (NSEs) becoming 
comparable to those of competitor countries (Aspgren, 2002, p. 102; Jacobsson et al., 
2001; Sohlman, 1996, p. 71). A recent international comparison of the proportion of 
NSEs within the total population holding tertiary qualifications shows Sweden in third 
place, surpassed by only Germany and Korea (Marklund et al., 2004, p. 47, Chart 13.2, 
c.f. OECD 2003). The Swedish educational system remains entirely under Swedish 
control, and is still largely dominated by the public sector (although private schools are 
currently growing rapidly). Swedish higher education, however, has strengthened its 
internationalization since joining the EU in 1995. There is now a fairly even balance between foreign students at Swedish universities and Swedish students abroad 
(Högskoleverket, 2003, p.13-14).  
Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) address some rigidities of teaching in their critique 
of Swedish higher education. Such rigidities include barriers to competition among 
universities for both faculty and students, and barriers to competition among faculty 
within universities, both rendering universities unresponsive to shifting market demands. 
Historically, low remuneration paid to teaching faculty for high performance in 
specialisations under strong demand, separation of undergraduate teaching and research, 
and fixed programmes of study providing students with little latitude for choosing 
courses have all combined to make the Swedish system of tertiary education rather slow 
to respond to changing markets (ibid., pp. 223-226).  
There has been considerable improvement in these areas since the early 1990s, which 
ushered in decentralisation reforms in both tertiary and non-tertiary education (Bauer et 
al., 1999; Lundahl, 2002). In tertiary education, these reforms were meant to make the 
system more market responsive and enhance international competitiveness. Although 
decentralisation has been achieved, it is still unclear whether it has translated into greater 
competitiveness. Arguably, the reforms have enhanced systemic flexibility at the level of 
competition among universities, but not yet sufficiently stimulated competition within 
universities. At the same time, it appears that many Swedish universities and colleges 
have not yet re-organised themselves to take full advantage of greater freedoms in 
internal decision-making (Alskling, 2001). 
To summarise, the Swedish education system scores high in international comparisons 
of both inputs and outputs, and has improved its flexibility. The fact that most graduates now work in knowledge intensive services, rather than manufacturing (Marklund et al., 
2004, p. 17), may help to explain why many of Sweden’s innovative firms are now 
located in services, rather than manufacturing. 
  
4.2  Demand side factors 
 
Historically, several new industries and technologies in Sweden have been closely tied to 
new domestic demand, with national procurement initiatives providing initial markets for 
several ‘state-sponsored development blocs’ (Glimstedt, 2000, p. 207). Public technology 
procurement (PTP) has, in earlier times, been an important innovation policy instrument 
(Edquist and Hommen, 2000).  
However, since Sweden joined the EU in 1995, its public agencies have faced greater 
institutional obstacles in undertaking PTP initiatives under the EC Directives on Public 
Procurement (Edquist, Hommen and Tsipouri, 2000). Sweden’s accession to the EU was 
accompanied by a wave of liberalisation reforms that resulted in the dismantling of many 
state agencies and the privatization of many state-owned companies. There is still some 
scope for the use of PTP as a demand-side instrument for innovation policy, using the 
Swedish public sector’s comparatively large size and high quality standards as points of 
leverage (Marklund et al., 2004, p. 9). However, most PTP projects now under way are 
mainly characterised by incremental innovation within existing industries. The 24SJU 
(24SEVEN) project of the Swedish Agency for Administrative Development, in which 
public administrations will procure information and communication technology solutions to make basic services available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, provides one 
example (Karlberg, 2004; Kleja, 2004).   
Product market regulation has shaped several important Swedish industries (Glimstedt, 
2000, pp. 184-202). Among ‘institutions specific for each technological system’ 
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997, p. 288), standards have been particularly important in, 
e.g., mobile telecommunications (ibid., 284-289; Glimstedt, 2001, p. 49). Standard-
setting contributed to Ericsson’s (and Nokia’s) current leadership in mobile 
telecommunications equipment through ‘early identification of new technological 
opportunities (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997, p. 284-289). However, standard-setting has 
become increasingly internationalized, and private actors, especially producers, have 
become dominant in influencing the development of standards (Hommen and Manninen, 
2003; Hommen, 2003).  
Recent Swedish innovation policy has replaced purely demand-side measures with 
public-private partnerships (PPP) combining demand-and supply-side measures. For 
instance, the Swedish Agency for Economics and Regional Growth (NUTEK) 
programme ‘Design for Environment in SMEs’ was based on ‘networks of firms 
involving research institutes, universities, and in some cases customers of the 
participating SMEs, based on industry-specific supply chains, or on specific product 
development’ (Fukasaku, 1998, p. 124).  
In summary, Sweden’s accession to the EU led to a shift in Swedish innovation policy, 
from a strategy of utilising domestic demand to one of relying upon international demand 
to stimulate industrial and technological development. Positive effects include gains in 
high-technology exports and new opportunities for MNEs (see Section 2). However, PTP and standard-setting have decreased in importance. These observations may help explain 
why the Swedish NSI currently performs better in turnover due to products ‘new to the 
firm’ rather than products ‘new to the market’. 
 
4.3  Provision of constituents    
 
4.3.1  Provision of organisations
17 
 
The birth rate of new firms is comparatively low in Sweden. This observation is 
worrying, since new firms are an important mechanism of industrial renewal. Even 
though 60 000-75 000 firms were established yearly during the 1990s, the population of 
new firms was still only 7.4 per cent of all companies in 2001.
18 In a large international 
survey, Sweden ranked only 33rd out of 41 countries in terms of the share of individuals 
engaging in firm formation (GEM, 2003). But in a study of new technology-based firms 
(NTBFs) established between 1975 and 1998 the accumulated population numbered 
almost 1 400 in 1998 (Rickne and Jacobsson, 1999), 
19  and their relative share has 
increased over time. Although firm formation has maintained a constant level during the 
last decade, there has been a steady increase in science or technology-based spin-offs 
from universities and companies.  
 An unusually high proportion of new firms endure: The three-year survival rate was 
an impressive 55 per cent in 1998 (ITPS, 2003a). Regarding stability, one study showed 
that 63 per cent of the high-tech spin-offs established in 1996 passed the 4-year survival limit, comparing favourably with other Nordic countries (Nås et al., 2004). However, two 
thirds of the new firms are one-person companies (ITPS, 2002), and most other firms also 
remain small (OECD, 2004, p. 101). One study reveals that out of firms surviving three 
years (1998-2001), 40 per cent show some growth (ITPS, 2003a) but only a few grow 
substantially. Also, less than a third of the spin-off firms created in 1996 had created any 
employment expansion in the following 4 years.  
Although many large, international companies have been created in Sweden, few of 
them were created during the last three decades. Among the newer established firms that 
do grow, some grow on their own account, but growth frequently seems to be enhanced 
by becoming part of a larger corporate structure through acquisition (Lindholm, 1994). 
Through mechanisms such as sub-contracting components and subsystems, acquisitions 
and spin-offs, large companies play an important role in creating and developing 
innovative new firms.  
On balance, Sweden lags in creation of new firms and their contribution to industrial 
renewal. High survival rates are enlarging the population of firms and the formation rate 
of high-tech firms is increasing. However, the relative lack of growth may partly explain 
Sweden’s lack of innovation as discussed in Section 3. The shift towards more service 
firms can be linked to the finding that Sweden’s innovative firms are now increasingly 
located in services rather than manufacturing, and that the highest rates of ‘new to the 
market’ product innovation occur in knowledge intensive services. 
 
4.3.2  Networking, interactive learning and knowledge integration 
 Empirical data indicates that innovative collaboration and networking seems to develop 
organically among Swedish actors and between Swedish and foreign actors. Swedish 
research often involves collaborations between researchers in firms and in universities or 
institutes, (private or public research organisations) resulting, for example, in joint 
publications or patents (Sandström et al., 2003). Out of all Swedish publications, 27 per 
cent are co-published with a national partner and 39 per cent with a foreign partner (EC, 
2003, Figure 5.4.2) The importance of spatial closeness is stressed where there is a 
preference for Nordic partners, but there are many non-Nordic foreign partnerships. 
Sweden’s rate of university participation in research joint ventures with US actors is – 
despite Sweden’s relative smallness – among the 6 highest in Europe (EC, 2003, Figure 
3.3.11). Naturally, patterns of R&D collaboration vary by sector, and science-based 
sectors such as biotechnology display very high intensities.  
University-industry relations are frequent and important in some sectors. One study 
showed that 93 per cent of the Swedish biotech firms reported university cooperation 
(Vinnova, 2001). However, Swedish industrial actors finance fewer activities in 
universities or research institutes than do firms in other EU countries (EC, 2003, Figures 
3.1.4-5). Also, a need for improved technology transfer is stressed by the finding that in 
East Gothia the main partners of firms pursuing product innovations are other firms 
(suppliers and customers), not universities (Edquist et al., 2000). 
Swedish firms frequently enter into licensing, joint development, marketing or 
distribution, outsourcing agreements, etc. A survey of collaboration in product 
development, covering all manufacturing firms in East Gothia found that 70 per cent of 
all product innovating firms relied on partnerships (Edquist et al., 2000). This tendency can be illustrated by e.g. the field of biocompatible materials, where innovating firms rely 
heavily on other actors, and a large variety of partners – national and foreign – supply 
technological competencies, financing, market guidance, etc. (Rickne, 2000). Types of 
partners and resource exchanges vary substantially across sectors – with, for example, 
biotech entailing mainly technology development but also market-oriented relations 
(Alm, 2004).  
These findings contrast starkly with evidence from CIS3,
20 where the proportion of 
cooperating enterprises was shown to be rather low in Sweden (around 30 per cent in 
1998-2000) compared to other European countries.
21 The consistent pattern across 
countries was that a much higher share of large firms cooperate for innovation. In 
Sweden, 2/3 of large firms cooperated, but only 1/3 of SMEs. Comparatively, Swedish 
firms displayed low cooperation in all sectors except KIBS.  
These competing observations, based on different data, each find support in the 
character of the Swedish system. The rather high degree of vertical integration in Sweden 
implies a lower degree of cooperation and fewer market-based sourcing solutions, as 
indicated by CIS. But the history and ownership structure of Swedish industry, as well as 
path dependencies involving technological trajectories, resource inertia, and variety 
creation (Glete, 1989; Rickne, 2000; Waluszewski, 2004) point to a system with 
extensive networking, as in the East Gothia study. Even so, there is a need to enhance 
collaboration and learning over organisational borders. Today, private initiatives such as 
industry associations and bridging organisations, as well as government schemes of 
various kinds – for example the Innovation Bridge Foundations and VINNOVA – continue to provide arenas for meetings, coordinate suppliers, or spur university-industry 
relations by making such cooperation a prerequisite for financing. 
 
4.3.3  Provision of institutions 
 
Here we focus on institutions such as science and technology (S&T) employment rules, 
corporatist arrangments, intellectual property rights (IPR) laws, competition rules and 
trade agreements.  
Andersson et al. (2002) and Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) point to insufficient 
incentives for academic entrepreneurship, with consequently poor performance in 
commercialising research results via NTBFs (Lindholm-Dahlstrand, 1997a; 1997b; 
Rickne and Jacobsson, 1999) including university-based start-ups (Olofsson and 
Wahlbin, 1993; Rickne and Jacobsson, 1996; Marklund, 2001). The Swedish labour 
market featured low returns on human capital from the 1960s to the 1980s (Edin and 
Topel, 1997; Fredriksson, 1997). In 1995, Sweden had the lowest wages for experienced 
teachers among leading OECD countries (OECD, 1995). Rigid pay scales and poor 
remuneration for high performance and specialisation in areas of high demand persist in 
academia (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Stankiewicz ,1986, p. 90).  
Sweden’s post-war social-democratic welfare state was favouring large firms and 
strong trade unions (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Sweden also developed corporatist 
economic policy-making based on tripartite co-operation (Ruin, 1974). Initially, the ‘core 
institution’ governing economic growth and industrial change was ‘labour market 
regulation’ (Benner, 1997, p. 202). Later, public companies, investment planning and R&D policy assumed more importance, and by the 1990s policy aimed at low inflation 
and labour market flexibility (ibid., pp. 205-213). However, corporatist arrangements 
remained intact (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993, p. 291). Unions were thus rewarded for co-
operation with employers, supporting production-based learning within firms and 
collaborative learning within industries (Glimstedt, 1995; 2000). However, extensive 
social security has been confined to large manufacturing firms and the public sector, 
encouraging a lock-in that can lower the impact of public investments in R&D and 
education (Andersson et al., 2002, pp. 45-46).  
Since 1949, the ‘university teachers’ exemption’ has granted faculty at Swedish 
universities complete ownership to research results. Arguments for the university 
teachers’ exemption stress that it minimizes bureaucracy and does not preclude voluntary 
agreements between universities and their employed scientists (Sellenthin, 2004). An 
alternative arrangement with university involvement would also require more effective 
technology transfer services (Rosenberg and Hagen, 2003, p. 25-26).Critics argue that 
this law does not mitigate costs, uncertainties and risks of commercialization (Brulin et 
al., 2000). Critics also point to a weak incentive structure with negative effects on both 
universities (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001, p. 225) and faculty (Etzkowitz et al., 
2002). There is also evidence of ‘anti-entrepreneurial peer pressure’ within university 
departments (SOU, 1996, p. 70). These conditions may have contributed to the 
underdevelopment of NTBFs in Sweden and may help to explain the low innovation 
intensity of SMEs. Some Swedish universities have therefore recently introduced 
extensive infrastructures for enhancing commercialization.    Sweden’s EU accession in 1995 implied liberalization and internationalization 
Deregulation of the capital market had already occurred in the 1980s. In the 1990s 
followed sweeping reforms in telecommunications (1993), electricity (1996), banking, 
finance, postal services (1993) and domestic air travel (1992). A central aim was to create 
new entrepreneurial arenas and innovation opportunities, in both Sweden and the EU. 
Since Sweden joined the EU, moreover, the ownership of Swedish MNEs has become 
increasingly internationalized (Andersson et al., 2002, pp. 28-29).  
To sum up, EU membership made it difficult to pursue ‘demand side’ innovation 
policy (Edquist, 2002, pp. 40-42), as argued in Section 4.2. Liberalization also spelled an 
end to ‘state-sponsored development blocs’ (Glimstedt, 2000, p. 207). Both S&T 
employment relations and IPR law and legislation can be linked to Sweden’s continuing 
underproduction of NTBFs – and, hence, the relatively low innovation intensity of 
Swedish SMEs. Conversely, aspects of both corporatist arrangements and competition 
and trade policy seem to have perpetuated the dominance of large firms and reinforced 
established technological trajectories. These factors help to account for the much higher 
innovation intensity of large firms, relative to SMEs, and Sweden’s generally poor 
performance with regard to the introduction of new to the market products. 
  
4.4  Support services for innovating firms   
 
4.4.1 Incubating  activities 
 Sweden’s division of labour in initiating, financing and operating science parks and 
incubators varies greatly and includes government supported non-profit units, university-
driven units, PPPs, and private initiatives in corporate incubators.
22 Incubation is seen as 
a potent policy tool, and university-related incubators have most often been initiated and 
financed by public money. Recently, a national technology-based incubator programme 
aiming to operate on a long-term basis and include financial support services has been 
designed on the initiative of government actors.  
Following the example of US and UK science park establishments in the 1970s, 
Sweden’s incubation activities commenced in 1983, with the Ideon Science Park in Lund 
(Bengtsson, 2003) and an additional 15 parks were established between 1983 and 1989. 
However, the positive results were not as strong or direct as anticipated (Ferguson, 1998; 
Lindelöf and Löfsten, 1999; Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002). This led to a systematic review, 
in which science parks were highlighted as only one instrument in an innovation 
environment (Vinnova, 2002). Today, some incubators are stable and successful, while 
many still struggle.  
The Swedish universities have incorporated ‘technology transfer offices’ similar to 
those at Stanford University or Massachusetts Institute of Technology only since the mid-
1990s. Today, most large universities have some form of unit for handling patent and 
licensing issues, and promoting entrepreneurial and cooperative activities. Searches for 
entrepreneurial opportunities are undertaken through e.g. venture competitions or 
innovation prizes. However, there is much more to be done. In 1998, Sweden officially 
assigned universities a ‘third mission’ of diffusing knowledge for societal use, but few 
means are devoted to it by governmental or other bodies. Academic researchers own the right to their inventions, but other supports for commercial activity – i.e., incentives, 
suitable career structure, time, financial resources, role models and experience – are often 
missing. 
While deficiencies in incubation may help to explain the relatively low innovation 
intensity of Swedish SMEs, there have been dramatic enhancements since the beginning 
of the 1990s. Policy actors and the bridging organisations they have formed, as well as 




Since the joint effort by government and a merchant bank to create the first venture 
capital (VC) firm in 1973, the Swedish VC industry has experienced waves of increase 
and decline (Berggren, 2002; Isaksson et al., 2004).
23 In the early 1980s a promising 
stock market and the formation of the OTC-list in Sweden encouraged both private actors 
and government funds to enter the industry. However, a shakeout followed, due to high 
interest rates, a weakening stock market and a promising real estate market. This resulted 
in a shift to majority investments and late stage financing. The 1990s saw a moderate 
growth, and the valuable experience cultivated by the long-term surviving VC firms was 
important when the situation evolved into a significant expansion of the industry in the 
latter part of the decade. This was a response to the increase of the number of high-tech 
firms, the growth in the stock market and input from both private savings and pension 
funds (Vinnova, 2002), and was consistent with European patterns. However, the global 
downturn affected the Swedish VC market in 2000 and a severe decline has followed. Based on the description above, Sweden has often been pointed out as having an 
impressive level of VC activity. It is indeed true that there are an increasing number of 
actors on the VC market, and that the percentage of GDP devoted to VC is well above the 
EU average (Eurostat, 2003). In fact, the number of actors tripled (from 50 to 150 firms) 
between 1998 and 2002, at the same time as the funds managed quadrupled (from 45 to 
SEK 190 billion). However, as Sweden started from a low figure, she is still in somewhat 
of a catch-up situation. In fact, many developed EU countries have been ahead of Sweden 
for many years and Sweden has yet to develop a fully competent capital market with 
experienced actors and sufficient institutional support (Karaömerlioglu and Jacobsson, 
2000; European Commission, 2003). While an upsurge has certainly put Sweden on the 
map and been important for firm formation and growth, the industry can still be 
characterized as relatively immature, in terms of institutional structure, phase of 
financing and sectoral focus.  
Thus, first, there are some misgivings about the institutional structure underlying the 
VC market. In effect, in a comparative study analysing the regulatory environment for 
VC, Sweden was ranked below average in Europe (EVAC, 2004). Positive features 
mentioned are the fund structure, the company tax rate, the ease of registering a new 
company and the regulation for reorganization and bankruptcy of a company. More 
negative aspects include the strict regulation of mergers, the lack of a special tax rate for 
SMEs, the income and capital gain taxes for individuals, the lack of tax incentives for 
individuals, and the lack of fiscal incentives for inter-firm cooperation (see also SVCA, 
2002).  Second, as regards the phases of development which are VC financed, a relatively 
large share of the funds has been allocated over time to late stage development. Indeed, 
surveys show that 30-50 per cent of the funds managed by Swedish VC firms are 
invested in any of the phases from seed to expansion, and the rest in buyouts (EVAC, 
2001). In fact, while the heavy lagging seed financing has displayed an upsurge since 
1998, later figures have disputed this trend (Nutek, 2004). Interestingly, although the 
government aimed to increase the volume of seed capital through the establishment of 
two large investment organizations in 1992 (Atle and Bure), these bodies subsequently 
refocused on later stage financing (Isaksson and Cornelius, 1998). While the lack of early 
stage financing to some extent seems to be handled by the entrepreneur’s own sources, 
bank loans are mainly an option for more mature buyouts and neither source is sufficient 
(Nutek, 2004).  
Third, another worry concerns the sectoral focus, where only 28 per cent of the total 
equity capital in Sweden is allocated to high-tech sectors, as compared to the EU average 
of 38 per cent and the astonishing US figure of 79 per cent (European Commission, 
2003).  
All-in-all, even though several EU countries have long been ahead, Sweden does have 
a good situation with growing financial options for firm formation and expansion. 
However, there is clearly a quandary in Sweden as regards maturity of the VC market and 
the involvement of all the types of actors necessary for a smooth sequence of financing 
and the provision of resources to high-technology firms. Much has been done towards the 
development of the VC industry in Sweden, but it still requires much improvement, and 
its current state may help to explain why the innovation intensity of Swedish SMEs is not exceptionally high. Especially, the fact that there is a relative shortage of seed and early 
stage financing and the lack of high-tech focus may possibly contribute to explaining the 
Swedish paradox. A positive sign is a visible internationalization of the VC market. In 
fact, although domestic actors dominate the financing of innovation and VC firms located 
in Sweden invest mostly in Swedish firms (82 per cent) or in other Nordic companies (13 
per cent) (Nutek, 2004), foreign organisations are nevertheless involved in every fifth 
investment and the financing process has become more internationalized. 
 
4.4.3  Provision of consultancy services 
 
Nearly all Sweden’s private consultancies are located in the KIBS sector.
24 VINNOVA’s 
recent comparison of nine countries – Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Italy, Norway, Sweden and the USA (Marklund et al., 2004, Figure 4.4) shows that 
Sweden’s KIBS sector is not especially large. Sweden ranks seventh in the proportion of 
total services belonging to KIBS, sixth in the percentage of the total labour force 
employed in KIBS, and sixth in the per centage of total population employed in KIBS 
(ibid.). The sector has recently expanded rapidly, with high employment growth from 
1981 to 1991, returning to more moderate rates in 1991-2000 (ibid., Table 5.4). This 
development was part of a more general change in sectoral employment patterns, 
whereby increasing employment in knowledge-intensive services, combined with stable 
employment in other services, contributed to a net increase in private sector services until 
1985, after which private sector employment in knowledge-intensive services continued to increase, while other private sector services, as well as public sector services, stagnated 
(ibid., p. 17).  
KIBS has clearly become important for innovation processes, due to the reorganisation 
of other sectors. Thus, KIBS has for some time accounted for a very large share of the 
employment of all Sweden’s qualified NSEs. In 1996, 41 per cent of all NSEs employed 
in private or public organisations were employed by manufacturing firms, and nearly as 
many were employed by firms in KIBS (Nutek, 1998, p. 133).
25 Moreover, a majority of 
the NSEs employed in KIBS were employed in small firms, bolstering the innovation 
capacity of SMEs. In manufacturing, especially in high-technology and medium-high-
technology industries, there has been (and remains) a strong positive association between 
firm size and NSE employment. Large firms in these industries accounted for two-thirds 
of the net increase in NSE employment in manufacturing over the period 1993-1996 
(ibid., p. 137). In services, though, a different pattern prevails. In KIBS, 63 per cent of the 
net increase in NSE employment took place in SMEs, and was fairly evenly divided 
between small firms and medium-sized firms, with 34 and 29 percentage points 
respectively (ibid.). 
Sweden’s KIBS sector also exhibits a high level of innovative activity itself. An 
analysis of CIS2 data for Sweden has shown that a high proportion of all innovating 
firms, well above the service sector average of 36 per cent, were found in the Financial 
Intermediation and KIBS sectors, where the shares of innovating firms were 59 per cent 
and 51 per cent, respectively  (Nählinder and Hommen, 2002, p. 11, Table 2). KIBS firms 
were also especially strong investors in human resource development related to 
innovation, with the proportion of all innovative KIBs firms investing in innovation-related training standing at 67 per cent – far more than in any other of the service sectors 
covered by the CIS2 survey (ibid. p. 12). A more recent analysis of independent survey 
data has confirmed these findings and provided a more detailed profile of innovation in 
Sweden’s KIBS sector (Nählinder, 2003). According to this survey’s results, 82 per cent 
of Swedish KIBS firms exhibit a high level of knowledge intensity in terms of the 
employment of qualified personnel (ibid., p. 14), and some 82 per cent of this population 
of firms engaged in some form of innovation during the period from 2000 to 2002 (ibid., 
p. 15). This figure is much higher than the corresponding figure of 51 per cent arrived at 
by the Swedish CIS2 survey, and is arguably more reliable, given that the CIS2 survey in 
Sweden provided poor and uneven coverage of the service sectors.  
To summarise, the recent expansion of Sweden’s KIBS sector, together with the 
centrality of KIBS firms to many innovation processes, and their typically high levels of 
knowledge intensity, may help to explain why Swedish firms are currently more 
innovative in some service sectors, particularly, finance and trade, as compared to 
manufacturing. These observations may also help to explain why the Swedish NSI also 
performs well in new to the market products within such service sectors. 
 
4.5  Summary of the main activities influencing innovation 
 
In our discussion of the nine activities influencing innovation processes we have, at 
times, related the arguments to the Swedish paradox. In the introduction, we mentioned 
three hypothetical explanations to the paradox: 1) there are obstacles to technology 
transfer from the R&D sphere to the commercial sphere; 2) sectoral allocation of R&D is problematic; and 3) internationalization of production means that the results of Swedish 
R&D is increasingly exploited abroad. We have found support for the first hypothesis 
under Section 4.1 (Knowledge inputs to innovation), Section 4.3 (Provision of 
constituents), and Section 4.4 (Support services for innovating firms). We have also 
found some support for the second hypothesis under Section 4.3 (Provision of 
constituents). However, we have found no support for the third hypothesis, which will be 
revisited in Section 6.  
 
5 Consequences  of  innovation 
 
In this section, we address the consequences of innovation. We focus on productivity at 
the micro, meso and macro levels. First, we assess the relation between innovation 
expenditure and turnover growth. Subsequently, we examine the relation between 
turnover and growth of value-added. Then, we consider evolution of labour productivity 
and sectoral changes in value-added. Finally, we assess changes in sectoral value-added. 
 
 Micro level 
 
On the micro-level, we find a weak
26 but significant
27 association for manufacturing 
firms between turnover increases of at least 10 per cent and engagement in innovation (as 
indicated by the level of innovation expenditure), for both the 1994-1996 and 1998-2000 
periods. Thus, the most successful firms (as measured by turnover increases) are likely to be those who have invested in innovation. However, it is problematic to identify causality 
here. It might be that the most successful firms are more likely to invest in innovation.  
Turning to the sectoral level, we hypothesize that sectors with the highest shares of 
turnover due to new products during the 1998-2000 period were also those with the 
highest growth of value-added in the following year. Changes in labour productivity 
between 2000 and 2001 derived from the STAN dataset show how productively labour is 
used to generate value-added (OECD, 2001). We couple this measure with the share of 
turnover due to new products during 1998-2000 according to CIS3.
28  
The result of the correlation test indicates a negative and significant correlation 
between the two variables.
29 This result suggests that, in a given sector, the higher the 
share of turnover due to new products during 1998-2000, the lower the growth of value-
added was likely to be between 2000 and 2001. 
This result rests on a small sample and must be regarded with caution. It may be 
partially explained by the spectacular drop in value-added of the ‘machinery and 
equipment’ sector between 2000 and 2001.
30 However, it could also be evidence that 
‘successful’ innovative sectors - as measured by the share of turnover due to new 
products - also experience the smallest increases in value-added. This is counter-intuitive 




To assess structural changes, we examine the last decade. We assess the average share of 
sectoral value-added as related to value-added created by the whole economy, as well as the variation of these shares relative to the grand total between 1991 and 2001 (see Table 
1).
31  
There were significant structural changes during the period. The weight of the 
manufacturing sectors increased relative to service sectors in the Swedish economy, 
representing an average share of 21 per cent versus. 69 per cent respectively of the total 
value-added between 1991 and 2001. ‘total manufacturing’ grew by 9.17 per cent 
whereas ‘total services’ grew only by 3.2 per cent. However, ‘computer and related 
activities’ experienced a spectacular 192 per cent increase, its relative share in the total 
value-added standing at 1.65 per cent. There was a concurrent decline of traditional low-
tech sectors. Both ‘construction’, and ‘cgriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing’ dropped 
by about 34 percentage points. The latter represented an average proportion of total 
value-added of 2.40 per cent, and the former an average share of 4.71 per cent. 
Comparing these sectoral differences in value-added with R&D expenditures between 
1993-2001, we note that the sector with the most dramatic growth in value-added – i.e. 
‘computer and related activities’ - has also undergone the strongest growth in R&D 
expenditures (from index 20 in 1995 to nearly index 120 in 2001). It experienced a 100 




Comparing evolution of labour productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked between 
1979 and 2001 (see Figure 1) with other countries, Sweden neither catches up with nor 
lags behind USA. Sweden has remained at a high level, slightly above 80 per cent of  USA level of labour productivity. Compared to the other countries, Sweden remained at 
fourth ranking almost all through the period, despite remarkable catching-up in most of 
the other countries. By 1997, Ireland had over-taken Sweden, and has performed better 
ever since, reaching the third rank and approaching becoming second-best (replacing the 
Netherlands). At this macro level, it is difficult to investigate clear relations between 
different kinds of innovations and performance; therefore we have to rely more on lower 
levels of aggregation for these purposes. 
Conclusions  
 
In summary, the most successful Swedish firms are likely to be those investing most in 
innovation. However, the most innovative sectors are also those experiencing the smallest 
increases in value-added. Sweden has had moderate success in evolution of labour 
productivity. However, the example of ‘Computer and related activities’ illustrates 
innovation’s positive impact on firms’ value-added.  
 
6 Globalization   
 
MNEs have played a central role in the Swedish NSI, accounting for as much as 70 per 
cent of the total private-sector R&D in the later 20th century (Braunerhjelm, 1998). As 
shown in Section 4, the dominance of domestic MNEs has contributed to the Swedish 
paradox by diminishing commercialization of research results and maintaining a disproportionately high allocation of R&D resources to low-and medium-technology 
sectors with little potential for growth. Many of Sweden’s large firms have long been 
highly internationalized in production and sales; more recently, ownership has also been 
internationalized (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993, p. 291-292). Foreign ownership and 
relocation of head offices has created great concern (Andersson, 1998) and off-shoring of 
more sophisticated forms of production threatens the innovative capacity of supplier 
industries (Metall, 1998). As suggested in Section 2, the latter trend may also eventually 
undermine the increases in high-technology manufacturing exports that Sweden achieved 
during the 1990s.  
In the mid-1990s, Sweden’s high-technology manufacturing MNEs had not yet begun 
to make the majority of their R&D investments abroad, and they are not likely to do so 
within the near future (Nutek, 1998, p. 113-118, Figures 6.11 and 6.13). Moreover, 
foreign subsidiaries still rely strongly upon exports from Sweden, and Sweden continues 
to have a positive trade balance in high-technology products (Marklund et al., 2003, pp. 
13 and 32, Figure 9.3). However, Swedish high-tech MNEs have begun to substitute 
outward FDI for exports based on domestic production (Braunerhjelm, 2004). Further, 
although these firms continue to invest strongly in R&D within Sweden, an increasing 
share of their production is located abroad (ITPS, 2003), and their contribution to GDP 
continues to decline (Marklund et al., 2003, p. 13). It is clear that the internationalization 
of production in Sweden has proceeded further than the internationalization of R&D, and 
that ‘multinational industrial groups find Sweden considerably more attractive for R&D 
activities than for production’ (ibid., p. 32). Thus, there is substantial support for the 
hypothesis that the Swedish paradox can be at least partly explained by globalization, in the sense that R&D carried out in Sweden increasingly bears fruit in terms of innovations 
in other countries. 
 
7 Strengths and weaknesses of the system and 
innovation policies 
 
Section 7 is based on our previous analysis. In Section 7.1, we concentrate on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the NSI and in Section 7.2 we focus on policies recently 
pursued. In Section 7.3, we address innovation policy implications for the future, based 
on the preceding discussion. 
 
 
7.1  Strengths and weaknesses  
 
 
From Section 3, we conclude that the Swedish NSI is strong on the input side and rather 
weak on the output side, i.e. the Swedish paradox is confirmed. One exception to the 
overall pattern of strength on the input side is that innovation expenditures of SMEs were 
not exceptionally high. Sweden has the greatest difference between large firms and SMEs 
in this respect. If high innovation expenditures is considered to be a weakness, we have 
thus also identified a weakness at the input end of the paradox. However, if a high innovation output can be achieved with a low input, it can also be considered to be a 
strength (see the discussion of small firms’ performance below). 
Transferring to the output side, Swedish firms were not particularly innovative 
according to an indicator measuring process and product innovation combined. However, 
they were more innovative in some service sectors than in manufacturing; manufacturing 
is weaker than some other parts of the system in this respect.  
Performance was poorer for process innovations than for new (to the firm) product 
innovations. This weakness is surprising in the light of previous studies, covering earlier 
periods. Judging from the CIS data, a new weakness in process innovations seems to have 
emerged during the 1990s. 
In introduction of new to the firm products, Sweden performed badly by one measure 
(proportion of firms carrying out product innovations) and well by another (turnover due 
to new to the firm products).
32 On the output side, the latter is the only indicator for 
which the Swedish NSI performs well. Hence the two indicators on new to the firm 
products point in different directions. However, with Sweden’s very high R&D and 
innovation intensities, this performance should have been better. On both indicators, 
Swedish firms performed somewhat better in some service sectors than in manufacturing. 
For new to the market products, Sweden performed very badly on both available 
indicators (proportion of all firms carrying out new to the market product innovations and 
proportion of turnover due to new to the market products). The paradox is certainly 
strong in this respect.  
It can also be noted that the performance on this indicator (new to the market product 
innovations) is much better for small firms than for large ones, i.e. small firms are much more ‘creative’ than large ones in comparison with the other countries in the sample. 
Hence, the overall performance of all firms – which is, on the average, worse with regard 
to creation than to imitation – can be explained by the domination of large firms in the 
Swedish NSI. We have above seen that small firms spend considerably less than large 
ones on innovation, and that (as expected) they perform rather badly with regard to 
number of innovative firms, but that they perform well above the average with regard to 
turnover due to new (to the market) products. This is a great strength of small firms 
within the Swedish NSI.  
Taken together, the results on the four last indicators discussed can be interpreted in 
the following way. As compared to input efforts, Swedish firms performed well with 
regard to one of the indicators capturing new to the firm products, but badly on the other 
one. Swedish firms performed badly with regard to both indicators capturing new to the 
market products. More specifically, Swedish firms are reasonably good at imitating 
products that have already been introduced elsewhere by other firms, but they are very 
bad at innovations that are brand new (new to the world). In broader terms, this means 
that the Swedish NSI is not creative in a profound way. It is locked into producing 
products that are not unique. 
Turning to the activities - or determinants of innovation processes - analysed in Section 
4, Sweden is strong with regard to R&D and competence-building. However, the 
generation of organizations causes concern. The volume of new firm formation is simply 
too low. Connected to this is a VC market whose growth has finally taken off, but which 
has not yet supported early stages and high-tech ventures sufficiently.  Other support services for innovating firms have been weak in the past but are now 
improving. Incubation support has been established in recent decades, through diverse 
actors and initiatives, and is now better coordinated. With the rapid expansion of KIBS, 
consultancy services are plentiful. 
As regards networking, a high degree of vertical integration may imply a lower degree 
of market-based sourcing solutions, as indicated by data from the CIS surveys, but in fact 
other studies point to a system with extensive networking, even though strengthening is 
needed in relation to e.g. university-industry collaboration. 
Demand side activities, generally, are underdeveloped, having been largely reduced to 
seeking global markets through internationalization and restructuring domestic markets 
through liberalization.  
Many problems of the Swedish NSI relate to institutions. Rigidities in S&T 
employment and uncertainties related to IPR legislation may have contributed to low 
rates of new firm creation. The relative success of large firms has been supported by 
corporatist organisation and competition and trade rules, but these institutions may also 
have hindered technological renewal by impeding the creation of new firms.  
Large firms remain central to the NSI, and, as shown in Section 6, they have also been 
the primary agents of globalization through outward FDI. As a result, much of the return 
on Sweden’s R&D investment is captured abroad, rather than domestically. 
 7.2  Summary and evaluation of innovation policies pursued 
 
We now address Swedish innovation policies pursued during the last two to three 
decades. We define innovation policy as all actions by public organizations related to the 
nine activities discussed in Section 4.
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Knowledge inputs to innovation 
 
The total R&D expenditures are high in the Swedish NSI. However, while the business 
sector is strong in this respect, the public sector is weaker. The public funding has also 
been distributed more widely among an increased population of higher education 
organisations whose numbers have been swelled by the creation of many new regional 
universities and university-colleges. Hence, established research universities have 
experienced a real decline in public research funding (Sörlin and Thörnqvist, 2000).  
Sweden has had a persistent under-production, relative to other economically advanced 
OECD countries, of university graduates in natural sciences and engineering subjects, 
particularly in disciplines related to high-technology industries, such as electronics and 
computer science (IVA, 1986). During the 1990s, therefore, Sweden greatly expanded its 
higher education system, focusing especially on increasing enrolments in natural sciences 
and engineering, and eventually reaching a level of NSEs graduation comparable to that 
of the US (Jacobsson et al., 2001).  
 Demand side factors 
 
Sweden’s relatively poor innovation output may partly be explained by the lack of market 
formation, where traditional instruments like regulation or PTP have recently had little 
scope, as compared to earlier decades.  
Historically, Sweden’s policy of ‘armed neutrality’ has meant that the military has 
been an important actor in the development of ‘indigenous military technology’ (Edquist 
and Lundvall, 1993, p. 281). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it no longer plays that role. 
Other influential public agencies in Sweden have included state owned authorities for 
infrastructure in areas such as power, transport and communications. During the mid-20th 
century, procurement contracts between the state power authority, Vattenfall, and ASEA 
(now merged into Asea Brown Bovery, ABB) led to ASEA’s early development of high 
voltage direct current transmission technology (Fridlund, 2000a). From 1954 to 1980, 
Televerket, the telecommunications authority, fostered Ericsson as a major supplier of 
telecommunications equipment, and later facilitated Ericsson’s entry into mobile 
telecommunications (Fridlund, 2000b; Hommen and Manninen, 2003). PTP by the 
Swedish Railway authority, SJ, supported the development of the X2000 high-speed train 
during the 1980s by the transport division of ASEA (Edquist, Hammarqvist and 
Hommen, 2000).  
Sweden’s accession to the EU has made it awkward to utilize many of the policy 
instruments formerly used by public organisations to stimulate the development of new 
technologies from the demand side. PTP is now seldom pursued. Similarly, technological 
standard setting (see Section 4.2) is now carried out primarily by private sector actors. In addition, large firms have also become less suitable partners for national ‘innovation 
policy’ due to the effects of globalization.  
 
Provision of Constituents 
 
When it comes to public organisations related to innovation, there have been frequent 
restructurings. In the late 1960s, there occurred an ‘industrial policy offensive’, 
characterized by ‘an emphasis on state ownership and public support to industrial 
renewal’ (Benner, 1997, p. 221). It included large public subsidies to sunset industries 
such as textiles and shipyards. For example the support to the ship-yard industry 
amounted to as much as 0.5 per cent of Sweden’s GDP for a ten-year period. It left no 
surviving results. Hence the industrial policy offensive eventually failed as industrial 
policy per se (Arvidsson et al., 2007, pp. 36 and 101-102). Failing support to ailing 
industrial sectors served as a lesson that everyone in Sweden seems to have accepted. No-
one now advocates public support for established industries that are not competitive. 
However, as we will see in Section 7.3, the negative attitude towards public support to 
specific sectors of production changed in 2004. 
However, the industrial policy offensive marked an important turning point for 
technology policy in another respect. It led to the creation of the Swedish Board for 
Technical Development – later transformed into NUTEK - and the initiation of a number 
of large-scale projects involving public and private sector cooperation in the development 
of new technologies in fields such as nuclear energy, telecommunications and military 
aircraft (Benner, 1997, pp. 121-123).  In 2001 important changes were made in the organisational set-up of innovation policy 
in Sweden.
34 NUTEK was divided into two parts, one still named NUTEK and the other 
one was called The Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA). VINNOVA’s 
mission is to promote sustainable growth by developing effective systems of innovation 
and funding problem-oriented research. The name is rather unusual, since national policy 
organisations are seldom named after an academic theory or approach. Renamings of 
relevant public activities and organisations from the 1960s to the early years of the 21st 
century also reflect a changing policy emphasis: from industrial policy, to technology 
policy and then to innovation policy. 
One important institutional measure has been to charge the universities with a third 
mission, which in 1998 was explicitly stated in the new regulation of universities as the 
task of engaging with the surrounding society, disseminating research information 
outside of academia and facilitating societal access to relevant information about research 
results (SOU, 1998, pp. 128 and 153-154). This reform was largely, though not 
exclusively, directed towards the commercialization of university-based research, through 
the promotion of various forms of university-industry collaboration. However, this third 
task is not regarded as at all as important as the ‘original’ tasks (teaching and research), 
e.g., in academic appointments.
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Support services for innovating firms 
 
The main policy initiatives taken in recent years to provide support services to innovating 
firms, particularly NTBFs, have been concerned with academic-industry relations, in areas such as public R&D expenditures, technology transfer initiatives (including the 
third mission), and public support for the financing of innovation. Higher education 
reforms (see Section 4.1.2) have figured prominently in this context, as have efforts to 
develop a VC industry in Sweden.  
In addition to the third mission, a number of other reforms in the area of academic-
industry relations have been implemented in recent years. From the early 1980s onwards, 
several Swedish universities have sought to build up an infrastructure for the exploitation 
of university patents and other research results. Between 1983 and 1997, 17 science parks 
were established in Sweden with government assistance, and since 1993 universities have 
been allowed to set up wholly owned companies for the commercialization of their 
research. (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001, p. 212) 
Increased public support for the financing of innovation has complemented the above-
mentioned reforms of higher education. NUTEK has continued its activities in this area, 
and since 1994 the Swedish government has also established seven Innovation Bridging 
Foundations in major university regions. Their mandate is to support the 
commercialization of (largely university-based) R&D by assisting inventors with 
patenting and aiding the start-up of SMEs – by, for example, locating appropriate VC 
financing (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001, p. 212).
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Numerous government schemes – as many as 140 in 1998 – have been introduced to 
increase the proportion of Swedish VC investment allocated to seed and early-stage 
financing for NTBFs, albeit with rather modest success (Landell et al., 1998). Public 
actors were essential for the formation of the VC industry, establishing the first VC firm, 
encouraging regional formation, and supplying most of the monetary resources during the 1970s and a significant share in the 1980s. Also, in the surge of VC formation in 1982-
1984 many smaller funds were formed by pension funds, insurance companies and real 
estate companies. Policy changes were crucial to these developments. For example, 
regulatory reforms allowed government pension funds to make equity investments 
(Karaomerlioglu and Jacobsson, 2000). In addition, the creation of the OTC-list in 1982 
opened up the stock market as an exit route (CEBR, 2001). Recently, the Innovation 
Bridging Foundations have become an increasingly important tool. As discussed in 
Section 4.4.2, there is still a relative shortage of seed and early stage financing. However, 
efforts to increase the overall size of Sweden’s VC industry have met with considerable 
success. During the late 1990s, Sweden became the third ranking EU country in terms of 
the amount of VC relative to GDP (Isaksson, 1999; Karaomerliogu and Jacobsson, 2000). 
 
7.3  Future innovation policy 
 
We now turn to suggesting policies for the future development of the Swedish NSI. 
Above, we have identified weaknesses representing problems and unexploited 
opportunities that should be subject to policy interventions or changes.
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We have confirmed the existence of the Swedish paradox, enlarging the input side to 
cover not only R&D but also all other innovation expenditures. We have also specified it 
on the demand side. Further, we have found support for all three hypotheses that have 
been advanced to explain the paradox. (1) In Section 4, on Activities that influence 
innovation, we found support for the first hypothesis, concerning obstacles to technology 
transfer from the R&D sphere to the commercial sphere, in relation to Section 4.1 (Knowledge inputs to innovation), Section 4.3 (Provision of constituents) and Section 4.4 
(Support services for innovating firms). (2) We also found support for the second 
hypothesis, which points to a problematic sectoral allocation of R&D, under Section 4.3 
(Provision of constituents). (3) The third hypothesis, according to which 
internationalization of production means that Swedish R&D is increasingly exploited 
abroad, was supported by our assessment of globalization in Section 6. 
The dominance of incumbent large manufacturing firms (MNEs) is a common element 
in all these explanations. We are therefore persuaded that the underlying problem 
concerns the apparent inability of these large firms to translate innovation inputs into 
outputs – at least not in a way that secures that the return on Sweden’s R&D investment 
is captured domestically, rather than abroad. 
(1) Regarding obstacles to technology transfer from the R&D to the commercial 
sphere, most recent policies have concentrated on creating incentives and infrastructures 
for improving university-to-industry technology transfer. Given that corporate sources 
account for 72 per cent of R&D funding, it would be logical to address the overwhelming 
domination of business sector R&D by large firms to a larger extent. This is especially 
so, since small firms are more efficient innovators than large ones - comparing inputs and 
outputs, i.e. productivity - and also perform better in product innovation. Innovation 
expenditures and resources are much lower for SMEs than for large firms. At the same 
time, large firms are becoming less suitable partners for a national innovation policy, 
because of ongoing globalization.  
Hence, there are strong reasons to increase R&D and innovation expenditures and 
efforts in SMEs in advanced sectors. The recently started VINNOVA program entitled Do Research and Grow (Forska och Väx) may be instrumental here. Regional clusters 
and collaboration in strategic R&D and innovation including SMEs should also be 
strengthened. One thing that could be done is to facilitate the spin-off of new firms from 
large firms, in cases where the latter are not commercialising results from R&D and 
innovation efforts to a sufficient extent. These instruments would lead to the 
establishment of more new innovation-based firms.  
(2) With respect to the problematic sectoral allocation of R&D, policy-makers have 
generally ignored the institutionally induced lock in of R&D resources and results to 
large firms in traditional sectors. Public agencies have even supported R&D in traditional 
sectors to a large extent, such as research in relation to forest-based industries, and 
provided direct subsidies to the textile and shipyard industries mentioned before. Further, 
many of the reforms introduced in recent decades have actually exacerbated this problem, 
reinforcing existing sectoral and technological specialization patterns. Therefore, there 
are reasons to stimulate the development of new knowledge-intensive industries, by 
encouraging large firms to diversify into them, by assisting the birth and growth of new 
innovation-based firms in new sectors and by attracting foreign firms in advanced sectors 
of production. One infrastructural mode of doing so would be to make more strategic use 
of public funding for R&D (Edquist, 2002, pp. 53-54).
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In 2004 the Swedish Ministry of Industry abandonded the dogmatic resistance to 
formulating policies at – and providing public support to - a sectoral level. This was 
actually a crucial paradigm shift in Swedish innovation policy which replaced the 
dogmatic rejection of sector-oriented policies based on the failures in textiles and ship-
yards mentioned in Section 7. The Ministry formulated 6 sectoral policy initiatives for the following sectors: Aerospace, Motor vehicles, Metals, Information Technology/Telecom, 
Forest and wood and Pharmaceuticals/biotech/medical technology.  
It is a major step forward that the policy is formulated at the sectoral level. However, it 
is (still) a problem that the list of sectors includes a large part of industry – and, 
accordingly also established and traditional sectors that can be expected to finance their 
own future development. Less policy effort and fewer public resources should be 
allocated to well-established, ‘traditional’ sectors, and stronger, more focussed 
interventions should be pursued in radically new areas of technical development (Edquist 
,2002, pp. 53-54; Arvidsson et al., 2007, pp. 9-18). In other words, public R&D and 
innovation efforts should be more effectively targeted to sectors of production that are 
new and where uncertainty is large.
39 Such a strategy can be seen as an attempt to 
balance previous policy measures – or, rather, mistakes – in Sweden. These mistakes 
have contributed to a lock-in effect that has actually supported the maintenance of the 
existing production structure. Examples are substantial support to ailing industries 
through subsidies, currency devaluations in the 1970s and 1980s and public R&D support 
to traditional industries. 
Complementary measures could be developed on the largely neglected demand-side of 
innovation policy by, e.g., following the EU’s recent ‘rediscovery’ of PTP as a policy 
instrument for stimulating private sector innovation. Sweden’s current lack of attention to 
the demand-side is reflected by the country’s poor performance in new to the market 
product innovations, with the exception of a few service sectors. These exceptions should 
provide models for new thinking on, and initiatives in, demand side policies, including 
new forms of PPS and new combinations of supply and demand side measures. (3) Regarding the internationalization of production by MNEs and the resulting failure 
to capture returns on R&D investment within the domestic economy, Sweden faces a 
quandary. On one hand, outward FDI has meant declining benefits from Sweden’s 
historical specialisation in low-tech and medium-tech sectors and industries dominated by 
very large and increasingly internationalized firms. On the other, it has also meant the 
development of Sweden into a global centre for R&D activities and services – a potential 
source of comparative advantage which, however, remains under-utilized. Public policy 
cannot intervene very much in the internal affairs of large firms in order to exploit this 
source of opportunity. Instead, it should try to build upon and complement their valuable 
contributions to the NSI, including the creation of a strong labour market for NSEs and 
other R&D personnel and expression of sophisticated, ‘leading edge’ demand in relation 
to domestic supplier industries.  
These innovation policies should include elements of ‘attraction policies’. These are a 
matter of how MNEs can be influenced to locate high productivity activities (such as 
R&D) within the borders of Sweden (Arvidsson et al., Chapter 8). However, there are 
certainly dilemmas associated with pursuing such policies in the present era of 
globalization. It can be questioned that the state in a small country, for example, 
subsidises R&D activities of large, foreign-owned MNEs. At the same time, public 
support to (R&D in) Swedish innovation-based SMEs can also means that the pay-offs 
for Sweden disappears – if the firms move early to other countries, maybe because they 
get larger subsidies there (Borrás et al., 2007). 
What should be addressed is the industrial ecology surrounding the large international 
firms, in an effort to replicate the virtuous relationships between KIBS firms and the large service sector firms whose unbundling created them (Nählinder, 2005). Much could 
be done towards achieving such a balance. For instance, supplier firms that already 
benefit from collaboration with MNEs should be encouraged to interact with a broader 
range of customers. Inter-firm networks of innovation in Sweden have a strong ‘vertical’ 
character, due to domination and control by a few large firms, and could be greatly 
enhanced by measures to support collaboration and learning over organisational borders. 
Increasing collaboration with customers through diversification should markedly improve 
Swedish firms’ poor performance with respect to product innovations – both those that 
are new to the market and those that are new to the firm. 
In addition to indicating some new policy directions, sketched above, our analysis also 
recommends continued support for some initiatives already under way. Efforts to 
stimulate translation of research results from universities into innovations in firms should 
be strengthened, by pushing the third mission, and improving both financing and 
additional support services for innovating firms, particularly those formed to exploit 
academic research results. Increasing the presence of this type of firm should help to 
ameliorate low innovation expenditures by SMEs in Sweden. The innovation gap 
between Sweden and other countries is greatest in manufacturing, and calls for more 
policy efforts targeted towards manufacturing. For instance, policy should try to make 
process innovation a preferable alternative to relocating production abroad.  
However, there is still also a general need to stimulate product innovation, since such 
innovation is the main engine of renewing the production structure of any NSI. Here, 
newer and smaller firms seem to be more creative than older and larger ones and should 
therefore be the main focus. Efforts to alter the production structure towards stronger representation of high-technology sectors should also be continued, with emphasis on 
entry into new knowledge fields and creation of new sectoral innovation systems. A shift 
towards a more knowledge-intensive structure of production would increase productivity, 
economic growth and employment. However, it can only be achieved by combining 
many of the policy measures discussed here. 
With regard to practically all the issues addressed in this chapter, much more data 
could – and should – be created and collected and the analysis should be made much 
more profound in many respects. This chapter has only scratched the surface and calls for 
more profound analysis of many issues. In addition, the NSI’s strengths and weaknesses 
will also change over time, and policies will have to be adjusted. This task requires 
continuous and in-depth analyses, to which considerable resources should be committed. 
Therefore, our most important policy proposal is that a collective analytical effort is 
needed to create a knowledge basis for innovation policy. Learning for policy and 
through policy is crucial 
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Notes: The Geary-Khamis method is used when benchmarking PPP's for GDP. It is used as an aggregation 
method used to weight and sum the commodity-group parities to arrive at PPP's for each category of 
expenditure up to the level of GDP. 
Source: Appendix 1: Statistical bases of comparison for ten ‘small country’ NSIs, 
 
 
 Figure 7.2: R&D expenditure
1 and value added
2 for the sector Computer and related 
activities in Sweden (year 2000=100) 
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Computer and related activities - R&D Computer and related activities - value added
Source: 
1 Own calculations ANBERD - R&D Expenditure in Industry (ISIC Rev.3) Vol. 
2003 release 01 
2 using the STAN database for Industrial Analysis Vol. 2004 release 04 
 
 Table 7.1: Industrial structure of Sweden – Average share of the value-added of the 
different sectors in the grand total (%) and variation of the share in the grand total (%) 






Variation   
1991 - 2001 
(%) 
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING  2,40  -34,26 
MINING AND QUARRYING  0,31  -30,99 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  20,79  9,17 
  Food products, beverages and tobacco  1,83  -4,51 
  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  0,29  -21,13 
  Wood and products of wood and cork  0,93  -11,93 
  Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  3,30  18,04 
  Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products  2,77  33,72 
 Other  non-metallic  mineral  products  0,51  -18,85 
  Basic metals and fabricated metal products  2,76  10,99 
  Machinery and equipment  5,15  -3,62 
 Transport  equipment  2,70  25,80 
 Manufacturing  n.e.c.  0,55  15,31 
CONSTRUCTION 4,71  -33,84 
TOTAL SERVICES  68,79  3,20 
    WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS  12,15  0,75 
    FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS SERVICES  23,60  14,38 
 Financial  intermediation  4,03  -25,96 
  Computer and related activities  1,65  191,83 
 Source: Own calculation and presentation based on STAN database for Industrial 











                                                 
1 Preparation of this chapter was jointly financed by VINNOVA, Sweden’s Agency for Innovation 
Systems, and ITPS (the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies). For comments on earlier drafts of 
this work, we are grateful to a number of colleagues, including: Luo, Yu-Ling, Nola Hewitt-Dundas 
Stephen Roper, Jan Fagerberg, Astrid Kander, Olof Ejermo and Bo Carlsson. 
2 This publication of 1998 was written in 1994, was internally published in 1996 and was based on a 
publication from 1992 – which, in its turn, was a translation of a chapter in an appendix to the final study of 
the Swedish Productivity Delegation from 1991 (Edquist and McKelvey, 1991). 
3 See further Sections 6 and 7 about the dominance of large firms in the Swedish NSI. 
4 The CIS data referred to here are presented in Section 4 of the Appendix 1: Statistical bases of 
comparison for ten ‘small country’ NSIs in this volume. A series of 15 tables provides detailed comparative 
data on the countries mentioned here. 
5 This also means that we will give priority to indicators that are available for both periods. 
6 This indicator includes not only R&D but also acquisition of machinery, equipment and knowledge,                                                                                                                                                  
training, market introduction of innovations, design and other preparations for production or distribution. 
7 In Bitard et al. (2005), Section 1, Footnote 1, we pointed out, however, that the data seems to be uncertain 
for innovation intensity 1998-2000. 
8 Our data measured mainly technological process innovations and did not include organisational process 
innovations. 
9 There it was shown that Swedish manufacturing firms were among the world leaders in the 1970s and 
1980s with regard to the diffusion of computer-controlled process technologies (numerically controlled 
machine tools, industrial robots and flexible manufacturing systems) in the engineering industry. 
10 This could indicate that the new (to the firm) products innovated, on average, account for large volumes 
of sales, which is certainly a great strength of the Swedish NSI. 
11 In addition, the input component of the Swedish paradox can be extended to all innovation expenditures, 
which does not only include R&D expenditures. Further, the difference between Sweden and the other 
countries with regard to this indicator was even larger for innovation intensity than for R&D intensity. In 
other words, the paradox can be reformulated along these lines: on the input side we could use innovation 
intensity instead of R&D intensity – or both. 
12 The analysis in this section partly supplements the discussion in Section 3. There the discussion was 
focused upon R&D performed by firms. Here both private and public R&D is discussed. The sources used 
are also different between Section 3 and Section 4.1.1.  
13 While we have no reason to doubt the high R&D expenditure in the business sector (accounting for 
approximately 75 per cent of the R&D expenditure), a recent study shows that there are some measurement 
problems involved in assessing non-business R&D, making this part of the R&D volume somewhat 
overestimated (Jacobsson and Rickne, 2004). This means that although Sweden does have a very high 
R&D expenditure, the figure of 4.3 per cent may be somewhat overestimated. 
14 As measured by the number of publications per input unit (e.g. the number of R&D personnel or 
researchers). 
15 Although this may not appear much higher than the EU average (77.9 per cent), there are large 
differences across countries (Finland. 71.8 per cent; Denmark, 60.6 per cent).                                                                                                                                                  
16 The common trend of reduction of defense budgets in the beginning of the 1990s has naturally had a 
strong influence on public R&D expenditures. 
17 This sub-section focuses on new firms. Other organisations, especially those that support innovation, will 
be discussed in Sections 4.4 and 7. 
18 There is a relatively large stock of small firms in Sweden, but not a high formation rate of new firms. 
19 NTBFs, or high-tech firms, are those with a clear scientifically or technologically innovative character 
(Rickne, 1999). 
20 CIS asked whether or not the firm had cooperated on innovation activities, and if so with what kind of 
partner. 
21 Note the study by Edquist et al. (2000) relates to product innovations only, while the CIS study also 
refers to process innovations. 
22 Science parks and incubators are, of course, two different things. In Sweden, however, most science 
parks have deliberately incorporated incubator functions, either formally or informally, and very few 
incubators are found outside of science parks. 
23 The venture capital and private equity industry (here termed the VC industry) involves the support of 
unlisted companies, both economically and with active owner involvement. 
24 The following discussion focuses on private consultancy services, and therefore on the KIBS sector. 
Public consultancy services have been addressed in Section 4.4.1 and will also be dealt with in Section 7. 
25 This source defines KIBS as including ‘business service firms, R&D firms and firms engaged in 
wholesale trade with machinery and equipment’ (NUTEK 1998: 133). 
26 Phi and Cramer’s V was equal to 0.115 in the first period and 0.148 in the second period. The values 
range between 0 (no correlation) and 1 (perfect correlation). 
27 At the 5 per cent level of confidence. 
28 A 10-sector decomposition was chosen, including the following sectors: Food products, beverages and 
tobacco; Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear; Wood and products of wood and cork; Chemical, 
rubber, plastics and fuel products; Other non-metallic mineral products; Machinery and equipment; 
Transport equipment; Manufacturing n.e.c. (not elsewhere classified); Financial intermediation and                                                                                                                                                  
Computer and related activities. 
29 cf. Pearson coefficient= -0,673, significant at the 5 per cent confidence level. 
30 At the same time, the volume of hours worked in this sector remained constant. 
31 Based on STAN database for Industrial Analysis (OECD, 2004, 06).  
32 As mentioned in Section 3, this could indicate that the new (to the firm) product innovations, on average, 
account for large volumes of sales, which is certainly a great strength of the Swedish NSI.  
33 The discussion here is structured according to the areas of activity discussed in section 4. It will 
concentrate on outlining broad, general trends in policy, since it is beyond the scope and possibility of this 
sub-section to mention all of the specific policy measures that have been taken. Instances of specific policy 
measures will only be referred to as examples used for illustration and explanation.  
34 With regard to the provision of organisations, public efforts to encourage the formation of new firms was 
be discussed under Section 4.4 (Support services to innovating firms) below. 
35 Institutional reforms, such as deregulation and privatization measures have been mentioned under 
Section 4.2 (Demand side factors). The same is true for policies for supporting networking and 
collaboration between organisations. 
36 In late 2004, the seven Innovation Bridge Foundations were reorganised into one national organisation 
with regional branches. 
37 We have also identified ‘strengths’. These should not be subject to policy or policy changes (since 
private actors or prevailing policies already secure a good performance). 
38 Anyone reflecting on this realizes that most policies – including publicly funded R&D – are problem-
oriented and selective rather than neutral. Of course, also firm strategies are a matter of selection between 
alternatives. For both public and private actors such choices are extremely difficult, but cannot be avoided. 
(These arguments are developed in the concluding chapter in this book.) 
39 As shown in the concluding chapter of this book, such policies have been pursued in many of the ten 
countries addressed.  
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